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The Philosophical Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes: The
Silent Films of Stan Brakhage
James Magrini1
Susan Sontag warns of the dangers associated with critical interpretations of
art that work off the mistaken notion that art is reducible to an accurate
interpretation if ‘certain codes, certain “rules” of interpretation’ are applied
and followed (Sontag 1966, 13).2 Herein, I seek to revisit the filmic art of
Stan Brakhage through the lens of philosophy in a way that avoids this
tendency toward reification in critique, acknowledging at the outset that the
depth and complexity of Brakhage’s work makes it impossible to approach
anything resembling a correct interpretation. For the capacity for these films
to make meaning lies beyond the grasp of even the most deft and careful
critic. Instead, what I am offering the reader is a constellation of interpretive
gestures gathered around the central theme of philosophy as they emerge
from the phenomenological tradition. I attempt to intimate several possible
ways that these films might express their truth.3 Sontag states that in most
interpretations of art, the intellect takes revenge on art in the attempt to do
the unthinkable, namely, render great art ‘manageable,’ because as she
rightly attests, great works of art hold the power to ‘make us nervous’
(Sontag 1966, 12). This, I propose, is exactly what Brakhage’s films do they shake us from our commonplace ways of seeing, understanding, and
discoursing about the world, and accomplish this in a philosophical manner.
His films work toward the recovery of the ‘bodily’ dimension of thought
and return us to the original moments, liminal events, that mark out human
becoming as we make the passage from the abyss, the void of absolute,
impersonal Being, to a formal sense of conscious self-awareness. Brakhage,
unlike any other filmmaker, captures and re-presents the precarious and
uncertain nature of such acts defining human subjectivity, haunted as they
are by the looming, foreboding presence of death, and does so, in great part,
through the formal and stylistic choices he makes as a filmmaker and artist.
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Sontag calls for the movement away from hermeneutics, and the concern with rendering
art’s content explicable and meaningful, toward a concern with describing art’s formal
characteristics and qualities, i.e., cutting ‘back content so that we can see the thing’ in the
quest to intuit ‘how it is what it is,’ and even ‘that it is what it is, rather than to show what it
means,’ and for this reason suggests an ‘erotics of art’ in place of hermeneutics (ibid. 14).
Indeed for Camus, this is the philosophical-artistic task of the absurd man, who is attuned
to existence in such a way that he realizes that when giving creative (artistic) expression to
a world ‘it is not a matter of explaining and solving, but of experiencing and describing’
(Camus 1983, 94).
3
In this essay I envision philosophy in a manner reminiscent of Heidegger’s rendering of
metaphysics in 1929: ‘Metaphysics is a questioning in which we inquire into beings as a
whole, and inquire in such a way that in doing so we ourselves, the questioners, are thereby
also included in the question, placed into question’ (Heidegger 1995, 12-13/9).
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On the Way to Philosophy Through Film
Berys Gaut states that we celebrate great works of art ‘for their profundity,
their insight into the human condition, for how they make us see the world
anew’ (Gaut 2006, 116). The qualities of great art that Gaut identifies are
epitomized in Brakhage’s work, which is from the beginning related to and
inseparable from a philosophical attitude toward existence, because his
films emerge out of an authentic ‘existential’ mode of attunement, a mindset wherein the potential for human transcendence is framed and filmed
within its intractable relationship to death, the most extreme possibility of
non-existence. Brakhage not only views existence in a philosophical manner,
beyond this, he engages in philosophical inquiry in a fundamental way
through the medium of film. The films arise from and respond to what Karl
Jaspers views as the ultimate source (arche) of philosophy, namely, ‘the
will to authentic communication,’ which embraces ‘wonder leading to
knowledge, doubt leading to certainty, forsakenness leading to the self’
(Jaspers 1954, 26). This amounts to the philosophical struggle to arrive at a
sense of metaphysical coherence and existential familiarity: a knowing of
and belonging to the world with others. This foregoing claim about the
relationship between philosophy and Brakhage’s filmic art draws inspiration
from Fred Camper who writes that while ‘the at-the-edge quality of his
work may have been born out of his personal psychology, it ultimately
becomes, particularly in his major films, a philosophical inquiry into the
nature of existence’ (Camper 2003, 5).
Brakhage draws inspiration for his work in a manner that weaves
philosophy and art together in a seamless relationship, in that he questions
and contemplates existence with the acuity and sensitivity of an artist,
attempting to come to some sort of philosophical understanding of the
situation, and then attempts to recreate this insight or vision in the artistic
medium of film, in doing so, the films live simultaneously on two levels: a
personal, or particular level, and a universal (transcendental) level, in that
they show or intimate something of the necessary and invariable
foundations of the human condition. For example, in Brakhage’s epic, Dog
Star Man (1961-1964), amidst the particularities of this woodcutter, this
mountain, this seemingly insurmountable life-task, this particular struggle
with dead wood, something of the universal emerges, and it might be
expressed in terms of what Jaspers identifies as ‘fundamental situations,’ or
existential-ontological situations, that can only be acknowledged and
confronted, never changed or surmounted – and it is only in relation to these
situations that human life holds the potential to become meaningful:
We are always in situations. Situations change, opportunities arise. If
they are missed they never return. I myself can work to change the
situation. But there are situations which remain essentially the same
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even if their momentary aspect changes and their shattering force is
obscured: I must die, I must suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to
chance, I involve myself inexorably in guilt. We call these
fundamental situations of our existence ultimate situations. (Jaspers
1954, 20)
The reconciliation of philosophy and art, which might be read as vengeance
against Plato’s revenge on art, is something we prominently encounter in the
German philosophical/aesthetic tradition, e.g., in Schopenhauer, who argues
the following: ‘Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom
towards solving the problem of existence’ (Schopenhauer 1969, 406).
Although they both share the same concern, namely, the search for meaning
in human existence, the methodology and the manner in which they express
their truths vary. Art is perceptual and philosophy is conceptual. This is the
manner in which analytic philosophy views the issue. However, in the socalled ‘Continental tradition,’ in somewhat crude and reductive terms, those
philosophers more concerned with Kant’s aesthetics and morals than his
epistemology, there is a blurring of the lines between philosophy and art in
such a way that conceptual knowledge and aesthetic understanding hold the
potential to co-exist. The knowledge that we glean from art, by means of the
aesthetic experience, which I will outline, is neither reducible to
propositional knowledge or calculative knowledge, nor is it wholly devoid
of cognitive content.
Vision and Knowledge in Philosophy and the Filmic Aesthetics of
Brakhage
While a detailed analysis and defense of cognitivism in aesthetics as related
specifically to the avant-garde is beyond the scope of this essay,4 there is a
way in which to approach the issue of knowledge and art by examining
what Brakhage states about the viewing of film. In the documentary
Brakhage on Film (Arnold Gassan and Carlos Steegmiller, 1965), Brakhage
4

James Young makes the case that works of avant-garde art ‘contribute little to knowledge,’
and since works of the avant-garde have little epistemological, or cognitive value, they
generally have little aesthetic value’ (Young 2001, 75). His position on art as a source of
knowledge is grounded in a representational theory of art, and in brief, his claim is that any
works of art wherein the content is not recognizable or discernable, does not contain a
substantial cognitive content and hence value. Works of the avant-garde, especially those
that are non-representational, depend on discourse, critical or otherwise, in order to have
their meaning suggested, i.e., in a strict sense, knowledge cannot occur through the isolated
experience of the spectator and work of art without the mediation of discourse, without
which these works ‘cannot be understood and do not represent except in conjunction with
what is said abut them’ (Young 2001, 79). If we focus on the discussions surrounding the
New York School of abstract expressionism and its ‘supposed’ dependence, for its
classification and subsequent value as art, on the critical writings of both Greenberg and
Rosenberg, Young’s point is elucidated. Clearly an entire essay could be devoted to the
analysis and classification of Brakhage’s films in terms of Young’s theory of avant-garde
art.
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likens the experience of watching film to that of participating in a religious
‘ritual.’ In the writings of William James, on the variety of religious
experience, the noetic, or knowledge-giving, aspect of such psychological
experiences is highlighted as one of several defining aspects of religious, or
spiritual, possession; namely, truth, which James likens to ‘illuminations,
revelations, full of significance and importance’ (James, 1923, 252). 5
Heidegger, although renouncing the ‘psychology’ of the event, as he thinks
in terms of fundamental modes of attunement, in his now-famous (or
infamous) interpretation of the Greek temple as monumental work of art,
also draws out the inner workings of what might be termed a religiousaesthetic-noetic experience for the Greeks who gathered at the great temple
for worship, and who were, in an ec-static moment of aesthetic attunement,
within the truth-happening of the artwork, transformed, transfigured in a
communal occurrence. Through an act of consecration inspired by the work
of art, as Heidegger contends, ‘the holy is opened up as holy and the god is
invoked into the openness of his presence’ (Heidegger 1971, 43-44). Below,
Brakhage articulates the unique form of knowledge that he envisions as
belonging to the domain of film-as-art. We might understand that the pursuit
of this type of aesthetic knowledge is not limited to the filmmaker and is
shared by the viewers of his films:
I suggest, there is a pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and
founded upon visual communication, demanding a development of
the optical mind, and dependent upon perception in the original and
deepest sense of the word. (Brakhage 2001, 12)
Two crucial points emerge from Brakhage’s statement as related to
philosophy and the topic of aesthetic knowledge: First, the knowledge of
which Brakhage speaks is analogous to the ancient Greek understanding of
αἴσθησις (aisthesis), which is present to philosophical discussions from the
Pre-Socratics through Plotinus, and generally represents the simultaneous
act of perception-cum-intellection. It is a legitimate form of perceptualemotional knowledge that is gleaned from works of art, and while it can be
poetised – expressed through metaphor and symbol – it defies language in
the sense that it differs in both form and content from empirical, axiomatic,
and what we might term ‘propositional knowledge,’ and is described as an
5

William James claims that rational states of consciousness are not the only way in which
we gain knowledge of the world, and in addition, the knowledge we gain through mystical
experiences has epistemological legitimacy. He argues that mystical states usually possess
four marks that define them as such. The first two, however, as he states emphatically, are
necessarily the defining components or characteristics of all mystical-religious experience:
(1) Ineffability – A religious experience ‘defies expression, that no adequate report of its
contents can be given in words’ (i.e., through propositional discourse), and (2) Noetic
quality – A religious experience provides ‘insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the
discursive intellect.’ James goes on to add that (3) Transiency and (4) Passivity, while often
times associated with religious experience, ‘are less sharply marked’ (ibid. 253).
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immediate perceptual-noetic insight into whatever truth the artwork might
inspire. Aesthetic knowledge, or understanding, is a legitimate form of
world-disclosure, or movement into the truth as aletheuein (dis-closedness).
Far from a difficult or spurious epistemological notion, this form of
knowledge might be likened to what Nelson Goodman views as emotionalcognition, wherein our unique encounter with art adds to, deepens, and
refines our understanding of the world in ways that would have been
impossible without the encounter with the work of art. The artist, according
to Goodman, ‘grasps fresh and significant relationships’ through her
immersion in the world, and then ‘devises means for making them manifest,’
i.e., making them accessible to others within works of art, which function
epistemologically in a unique manner (Goodman 1968, 32).
Secondly, Brakhage’s focus on vision and the understanding of what
he terms the ‘optical mind,’ were both notions intimately familiar to the
ancient Greeks. As Jean Pierre-Vernant relates, vision had a privileged
status for the Greeks, and unlike the Cartesian admonition to turn from the
senses into the isolated, interior world of the subject founded on elementary
truths gleaned a priori by means of pure reason, in opposition to things seen,
the Greeks viewed knowing as seeing,
to see and to know were one; if idein, “to see,” and eidenai, “to
know,” are two verbal forms of the same term, eidos, “appearance,
visible aspect,” also means “the specific character, the intelligible
form,” this is because knowledge was interpreted and expressed
through one’s way of seeing. (Vernant 1995, 16-17)
Vision set the Greeks within the world in a way that defies metaphysical
dualism. Prior to any discourse in modern philosophical circles, the ancient
Greek was a Being-in-the-world in the most intimate, visceral, and
primordial sense of this notion: ‘To see and live were one in the same, and
to be living, one had at the same time to see the light of the sun and to be
visible to the eyes of all’ (Vernant 1995, 20). To leave the light of the sun
signaled the loss of sight, the loss of knowledge, and the loss of Being, for
to ‘leave and abandon the clarity of day was to delve into another world,
that of Night’ (Vernant 1995, 12).
This is certainly not to indicate that the Greeks accepted prima facie
that which came to presence before them, in fact they were well aware that
phenomena tend toward dissembling and concealment, but this is not to
invalidate the claim that vision located them within an authentic
epistemological and metaphysical relationship with the world of their
experience. However, Plato had a unique view of vision as it related to the
real world, or realm of true Being, and this emerges through the nonnaturalism and ontological dualism of his philosophy, wherein existence is
divided into two distinct realms: (1) the physical world, which is visible and
accessible through sense perception, always changing and deceptive, and (2)
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the upper world of the forms (eidai), which are paradigms for the physical
instantiation of entities. It is the case that for Plato, as he writes in the
Phaedrus, the bodily (visual) experience of beauty captivates us through
scintillating, sensuous appearance, and grants access to the immediacy of
sensory appearances while simultaneously drawing us beyond the realm of
the sensuous to the super-sensuous realm of the forms, where true Being
resides at a remove from the lower realm of experience, which Plato literally
classifies as me on, or ‘non-being.’ In Plato, there is an acute attention to
vision as it is bound up with the occurrence of an aesthetic experience, but
ultimately its value lies in its ability to facilitate the movement away from
the type of embodied thinking that great art inspires, away from the
sensuous context of the lived world of our experience wherein the life-blood
of art pulses.
The sun for Plato, as described in The Republic, is the source of light,
which represents the origin (arche) of vision, growth, and development, but
it is not equated with any of these processes directly, and rather is a
metaphor for the Form (eidos) of the Good, which is itself nothing
experiential, but is the authentic source of goodness within the realm of the
experiential. In other words, nothing would be capable of being defined as
good in the sensate realm, if it did not participate in this Form, which is
super-sensuous: ‘Light,’ as Emmanuel Levinas reasons, ‘whether it
emanates from the sensible or from the intelligible sun, is since Plato said to
be a condition for all beings’ (Levinas 1978, 47). This represents the
erroneous belief prevalent in our thought today, namely, the epistemological
predisposition to associate light and its illumination with truth. In addition
to Levinas, both Heidegger and Derrida are critical of this modern PlatonicCartesianism, which manifests in terms of the metaphysics of presence. As
the logic runs, when things are revealed, they are brought into the clarifying
light of truth, and when things are understood, they are possessed, as one
might possess a present-at-hand object; they have been made manageable.
‘Light makes objects into a world,’ writes Levinas, ‘that is, makes them
belong to us’ (ibid. 48). Thus, there is a propensity for truth to be
understood in the following manner: truth is viewed as a form of possession,
or ownership, and truth is then wielded as a scepter for control and
domination. Foucault reminds us that we must be cautious about
approaching truth in this manner. For within the relationship between
knowledge (truth) and power, power depends for its effectiveness on
knowledge with respect to those claiming possession of it, and knowledge
engenders and legitimizes power.
The films of Brakhage radically subvert this philosophical tendency
ingrained in the modern consciousness, for Brakhage’s art flies in the face
of ‘our tendency to limit ourselves to settling on a single way of thinking, a
single way of seeing, a single set of objects defined or possessed’ (Camper
2003, 9). For the illuminated images within his films, even when they are
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not abstract, are certainly not representational in the classical, traditional
sense of the cinema. In most instances they are recalcitrant to any efforts to
concretize them in terms of the understanding, e.g., the shimmering images
that are brilliantly bathed in the direct, reflected, and refracted light in
Commingled Containers (1998), evade our comprehension and tend toward
dissembling and illusion, or what the Greeks called phantasia, which refers
to the appearance of things by way of the senses that manifest as phantasma
- apparitions and visions. Brakhage may well be taking the viewer on an
imaginative journey, but he refuses to grant us access to a transcendent
world beyond the films, a superior, paradigmatic world of Platonic supersensuous truth, as if a real world beyond the immediate experience of the
film existed. Brakhage also refuses to provide a vision of the world wherein
it is rendered understandable, where it has been reified in knowledge.
Brakhage’s films refuse to provide the viewer with ‘metaphysical solace,’
which is to say, these films fail to satisfy ‘man’s unconscious feeling in the
face of his universe, [his] insistence upon familiarity and appetite for clarity,
that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute’ (Camus 1983, 17).
The philosophical questions Brakhage asks, which give rise to the film in
the first instance, always remain as questions, because he is asking original,
or fundamental, questions, which are philosophical and of a dual-nature:
they are transformative, they seek to reveal things that facilitate our
development, and they at once inspire us toward the mode of preservation,
they inspire the care and keeping of the basic question-worthy status of the
things and issues his films address, such as love, existence, freedom, and
human potential.
The Return to Embodied Human Consciousness in the Films of
Brakhage
Prior to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who ushered in a
way to radically re-think our “bodily” connection to the world (the ‘bodysubject’), Nietzsche, who might be considered a proto-existentialist, fought
against the traditional notion of the single, hypostatized ego-subject and was
already carving out a prominent place for the body in philosophy after it had
been exiled in favor of the power of reason (mind) to think true Being at a
remove from the experiential realm – namely, he was attempting to overturn
Platonism: In place of Plato and the ‘two worlds’ of truth and seeming, he
proposes one world, and in it he locates ‘the phenomenon of the body,’
which for Nietzsche is far ‘more fundamental than belief in the soul,’
because it is a ‘richer, clearer, more tangible phenomenon’ than either the
belief in the soul or in the power of so-called ‘detached thought’ to
accurately capture the depth and complexity of our existence (Nietzsche
1967, 270). Brakhage, in a radical manner, in an act of trans-valuating
traditional cinematic values, sought to overturn the conventions of modern
filmmaking. First, Brakhage rethinks the role of the spectator in terms of
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participant, for his films ‘make uncompromising demands on the viewer to
elicit and construct meaning,’ because Brakhage shifts the ‘attention from
the author’s voice to the spectator’s eye’ (Rees 1999, 68-69). Secondly,
Brakhage seeks to retune the senses of the cinemagoer by eliciting the body,
in terms of consciousness as an embodied phenomenon, as the primary
mode in which to experience his films, which includes, most importantly,
re-teaching the spectator to see and feel again, as if for the first time. This is
precisely what is called for in the mechanical age of reproduction, which
might in part be inspired through sensitive art critique: the rediscovering
and recovering of our senses and the meditative capacity of our Being as
related to life and works of art.
Brakhage succeeds in getting us to see and feel more, but this
phenomenon is not reducible to the incorporation of non-representational
shapes and images, as in films such as Purgation (1987) and ‘existence is
song’ [sic] (1987), which on the surface are abstract studies of color and
light that challenge the eyes and the conscious sensibilities of those
engaging the films. Brakhage also radically alters the cinematic experience
of the spectator due to the unconventional manner in which he physically
wields the camera to produce the types of shots incorporated into such films
as Desistfilm (1954), Anticipation of the Night (1958), and Dog Star Man.
For example, in Desistfilm the camera not only shakes in an unsteady
fashion, it jerks rapidly, yet with a sense of purpose and precision, from one
subject to another in the interior shots of the intoxicated youths. In Dog Star
Man the camera whirls and spins in a manner that elicits an out-of-control,
spiraling and dizzying effect, as Brakhage re-creates the woodcutter’s vision
of the sky as viewed through the twisted, outstretched branches of the great
trees that menacingly look down from above. In short, filming a movie for
Brakhage was an intense, unadulterated bodily event, and often the result of
hard and intensive physical labor on the part of the filmmaker. In Brakhage
on Film, Brakhage is shown in the woods practicing various and quite
radical techniques for filming with an empty camera, literally performing
repetitive exercises in creative movement that closely resemble the beautiful
and strange movements of modern dance, in order for these movements to
become for him second-nature, as part of his organic bodily make-up.
Listening to the interview, it becomes clear that for Brakhage, filmmaking is
as much about the bones and sinew – the blood and sweat – of the artist as it
is the capacity and capability to see and visualize in perceptive and
imaginative ways.
In the documentary Brakhage (Jim Shedden, 1999), we encounter an
interview where the filmmaker actually reverses the polarity, the traditional
relationship, between eye and camera. While it is the case that Brakhage’s
camera, which produces the film, retunes the vision of the spectator who is
taught to see anew, it might just as well be said that Brakhage is training the
camera to see and behave more like the human eye. He explains for both
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interviewer and cameraman the very way in which the classic Hollywood
pan-shot, where the camera moves smoothly from one side to the other,
located firmly on a tri-pod, is completely unnatural and antithetic to the way
in which our eyes really take in the environment, and states emphatically,
‘The eyes can’t see that way.’ Thus, as opposed to classic cinema, where in
most cases the camera is most present when it is absent, or unobtrusive, in
the films where Brakhage is not painting directly on the film-strips, there is
a stark and bold obtrusive presence to the camera within the frames of the
films. As indicated above, it is a living-camera that shakes, trembles, and
darts to and fro with a sense of autonomous conviction in order to transcend
the mechanical, the cold technological remove of the machine, and return it
to the lived world of the filmmaker, as a physical and emotional extension
of the person holding the camera, who views herself and world, through it,
and in turn invites the spectator to dwell in this world as if he or she is
viewing the world directly through the filmmaker’s third organic eye.
I think immediately of two such films that bespeak the situatedness
of the human within the conscious world of its poetic making, as anchored
within that world by the camera and overall vision of Brakhage, wherein its
most primary mode of dwelling is undoubtedly linked to the optical organ:
Window Water Baby Moving (1959) and The Act of Seeing with One’s Own
Eyes (1971). Camper, commenting on The Act of Seeing with One's Own
Eyes, alludes to the situatedness of Brakhage’s vision when describing the
film as a ‘curious’ and ‘creepy,’ study of the ‘varieties of light reflected off
of skin, with luminous fluids appearing to dance with the camera’ (Camper
2003, 7). These films, when viewed one after the other, represent a powerful
philosophical womb-to-tomb meditation on the human condition, with all of
its ecstatic moments of joy, elation, and sublime wonder along with the
concomitant horrors, fear of the unknown, and the realization of the fragile
and ephemeral nature of human existence, all revealed though a vision
within which we participate, and are granted privileged access to, only
through the act of seeing qua seeing. There is a fusion of worlds taking
place as we experience these films: Our ‘lived world’ merges and
participates in the visceral lived world of the film. We are in a quite literal
sense present to the birth of the child, exploding with life and shimmering
with liquid color, present in the morgue with all of its macabre, clinical
sublimity, which is accentuated by the cold and calculating manner the
medical examiner is probing, measuring, and examining the body prior to
the incision. This film emanates a beautiful glowing reddish-orange hue in
varying shades and tones, all of which transform the film into a
contemporary filmic analogue to the grotesque, beautifully illumed
paintings by Caravaggio, such as Judith Beheading Holofernes.
It is possible to relate the latter of these two films to the ontology of
death as we find in early Heidegger. Were we to remain in the cold, sterile
atmosphere of the morgue, amidst the lifeless forms, we would identify
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death merely in biological terms, i.e., the cessation of the organs, thus
viewing death in an inauthentic manner, as that phenomenon that happens to
others, or as a quasi-established abstracted truth, which occurs at some
distant point in the future. When understanding death in this manner, we are,
according to Heidegger, ‘fleeing-in-the-face of death’ in terms of its
ontological magnitude. For Heidegger, it is the mood (Stimmung) of anxiety
(Angst) that puts us, through a process of existential solipsism
(individuation), in touch with the ontological aspects of our Being, namely,
our mortality (Heidegger 1962). It is possible to state that the aesthetic
experience we have with Brakhage’s films attunes us in such a way that we
might be free for the possibility of embracing death in terms other than the
everyday understanding of it, wherein all of our possibilities are
subordinated to the uttermost possibility of death, and thus become
provisional in light of our finitude and mortality. In essence, when we
embrace the ontological implications of death, there is an anticipation of
death, an authentic comportment to death, which amounts to maintaining
oneself within the imminent threat of death’s indefinite certainty at each and
every moment of our existence. This ontological understanding hinges on
the way that Brakhage’s film has framed the events for us, for while they
contain the same content as would be consistent with a scientific
documentary on autopsy, it is through the transfiguring lens of his filmic art
that this world of the morgue is shown in philosophical terms wherein there
is a play of and counter-striving between the ontic and ontological, and here
I draw a linguistic-etymological analogue by imagining life depicted on the
‘slab’ in terms of what the Greeks called bios, the finite individuated life of
this person, in its ontological relationship to the general potential and
processes of life qua life as zoe, e.g., as associated with animated life in the
philosophical hylozoism of the Pre-Socratics.
Clearly the concept of the ontological difference is present to
modern existentialism and phenomenology, which generally unfolds
through two phases: the phenomenological epoche (‘bracketing’) and the
eidetic reduction. Within this two-fold process the philosopher, in a
preparatory moment, suspends her judgment with respect to the
phenomenon under investigation, this allows for a whole range of unique
and previously overlooked dimensions of experience to manifest. The
phenomenological method allows us to see things through a reconfigured
lens where epistemological and psychological categories are held in
abeyance and things appear non-contingent and independent of our
subjective categorizations for defining and understanding them. This reveals
insight into the essential and invariant structures (ontological-existential)
that give form to our existence. We see, as it were, in the particular
manifestation of phenomena what is essential, or universal, to all
phenomena of a similar type, e.g., this method would allow us to intuitively
glean the existence of fundamental ontological situations, which are
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instantiated empirically, and within which we all find ourselves, such as
those earlier introduced. This relates directly to what Camper writes about
the process of readying oneself for the experience of Brakhage’s films,
specifically the ‘openness’ and ‘attentiveness’ the viewer must cultivate in
order to truly appreciate and benefit from the experience, and this includes
the relaxed attitude of letting go of previously held conceptions, stripping
oneself of prejudices about what film is or should be. Cleansing one’s
conscious aesthetic palette, as it were, facilitates the mind-set required for
the spectator to plumb ‘the depths of its imagery and the various themes and
ideas suggested by its subject matter – imaginatively dancing with its
flickering rhythms’ (Camper 2003, 4). This process allows for the
manifestation of things never before imagined, which initially involves a
sense of giving, or releasing, oneself over to these films, and in a resolute
manner, becoming open to new truths, indeterminate truths, that are on the
approach in a unique way from the film.
The Philosophical Experience of the Films: The Struggle for Self and
World Amidst the Deafening Silence and Oppressive ‘Presence’ of
Impersonal Being
In Brakhage on Film, the filmmaker states that he would prefer his 8mm
films be experienced by the viewer in the comfort of her own home,
wherein she can live with the images and meditate fully on them until they
become familiar. In essence, the spectator creates the cinematic context
within which the aesthetic experience occurs by reproducing the atmosphere
of the cinema. This is precisely what Camper suggests that we must do
when watching digital video reproductions of Brakhage’s original films.
Much like Jean Goudal, who in ‘Surrealism and Cinema’ insists that the
milieu of the darkened theatre is essential in recreating the dreamer’s habitat,
which is crucial to inspiring the superior state of ‘surreal’ consciousness,
Camper suggests a way in which to best ‘approximate the conditions of the
cinema,’ because in order to fully experience Brakhage’s work it is
‘especially important not to view Brakhage films in the way most are
accustomed to screening videos’ (Camper 2003, 4). The atmosphere, he
suggests, is one that is dark, intimate, and devoid of distractions, and for the
silent films, I argue this is most crucial. Viewing a film by Brakhage is best
approached within a space that, proximally and for the most part, privileges
vision and hearing, a context that accentuates our vision and hearing,
facilitating them into the acuity of their full power. For not only do our eyes
need to be re-trained, but the screening of the films also provides an
opportunity to re-train our aural sensibilities: The silent films of Brakhage
invite the return to our original ontological predisposition to hear – our
originary auditory capacity that makes it possible to listen in anticipation of
the truth of the art work, to listen, like the poet, for the call of the gods, to
listen, as Heidegger insists, for the call of conscience, which awakens us to
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our authentic potential for Being.
It is possible to draw an analogy between the silence of Brakhage’s
films and the primordial silence of Being, which is something far more than
merely the absence of sound. Below I reference Levinas’s description of the
presence-in-absence of impersonal Being in terms of a ‘rumbling silence’ as
related by Brakhage’s choice to screen many of his films in silence. The
primordial silence of Being, states Levinas,
is something resembling what one hears when one puts an empty
shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness were full, as if the silence
were a noise. It is something one can also feel when one thinks that
even if there were nothing, the fact that “there is” is undeniable.
(Levinas 1982, 48)
This is precisely the experience of noise one hears and feels when viewing
the silent films of Brakhage, and the aesthetic experience, along with the
creation and enhancement thereof, is dependent in great part on the
cinematic environment one has organized as described above. The
incorporation of silence in Brakhage’s films is a crucial formal, stylistic,
and aesthetic choice grounded in the quest to remain true to the purely
visual aspect of film. In ‘The 60th Birthday Interview,’ Suranjan Ganguly
asks Brakhage what he learned from his relationships with both Varese and
Cage, and Brakhage offers the following: ‘Primarily what I got from them
was the inspiration to make silent film’ (quoted in Ganguly 2002, 148). In
the documentary Brakhage, filmmaker Phil Solomon speaks about the
detrimental effect a sound track would have had on Brakhage’s films.
‘Brakhage,’ states Solomon, ‘developed a sophisticated visual aesthetic
based primarily on rhythm, and if one puts a soundtrack on, you face the
possibility of being redundant.’ The works, due to their visual rhythm
created by the interplay of images and editing techniques, inspire a ‘mind’s
eye soundtrack.’ Solomon reasons that ‘if the major concern of film is
mainly visual, then the reason sound is a blind alley is that it cuts back sight,’
when film is silent, as Solomon suggests, ‘it becomes more possible to see.’
And, as I suggest, what we see (hear) and experience when viewing
a Brakhage film is the foreboding presence-in-absence of what Levinas
identifies as the ‘There is,’ or the ominous presence of impersonal Being.
As opposed to the dreamer’s milieu of Surrealism, when experiencing a
Brakhage film in the approximated conditions of the cinema, we might
imagine the spectator transported to a time before temporality, prior to the
formation of the subject conceived in hypostatic terms, which might be
poetized as a pre-linguistic world of Being prior to any and all beings,
entities, and consciousness itself. Levinas, philosophizing the ‘There is’ (il y
a), or the ‘existing without existents,’ writes:
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‘There is,’ in general, without it mattering what there is, without our
being able to fix a substantive to this term. ‘There is’ is an
impersonal form, like in it rains or it is warm. Its anonymity is
essential. The mind does not find itself faced with an apprehended
exterior […] The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what
cannot disappear, the sheer fact of Being in which one participates,
whether one wants to or not, without having taken an initiative,
anonymously. Being remains like a field of forces, like a heavy
atmosphere belonging to no one. (Levinas 1978, 58)

It is possible to relate Levinas’s notion of impersonal Being in poetic,
mythological terms to the great void of Chaos as conceived by the ancient
Greeks.
Chaos is an emptiness, a dark emptiness where nothing is visible. A
realm of falling, of vertigo and confusion - endless, bottomless. That
void seizes us like the yawning of an immense gullet where
everything is swallowed up by murky darkness. So at the start there
is only that Void, a blind, black, boundless abyss. (Vernant 2001, 3)
This ‘blind, black, boundless abyss’ is as impenetrable as the darkness of
night, and it is at night, during the darkest, blackest nocturnal hours that the
‘rumbling silence’ of impersonal Being is most powerfully heard and felt in
the midst of its deafening silence. For Levinas’s notion of the ‘There is’ can
be understood in terms of solitude and insomnia. In darkness we lack the
power to see anything, but intuit the undeniable presence of ‘something’ –
we hear it, we feel it. The night, as Levinas claims, induces horror in the
child who is relegated to the haunting solitude of his room. When as a child,
‘one sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his
bedroom as “rumbling”,’ and in such moments the ‘I’ is depersonalized, and
this is also related to insomnia, for in this state of persistent wakefulness
amid the night, ‘one can and one cannot say that there is a “I” which cannot
manage to fall asleep. The impossibility of escaping wakefulness is
something “objective,” independent of my initiative’ (Levinas 1982, 49). In
this state I am absolutely dependent upon the night, or impersonal Being, in
its persistence and threat. Yet this dependence is something that cannot be
transcended as long as we strive to give form to our conscious world as
subjects, as human beings, and accompanying this ontological truism is an
overwhelming sense of horror and dread, for only in death is there an
‘absolute negation wherein the music ends’ (Levinas 1982, 48). However,
as Levinas reasons, outside of this single fatality, ‘one has the impression of
a total impossibility of escaping it, of stopping the music’ (Levinas 1982,
49).
The ‘There is’ is indistinguishable from the sound of silence heard
amidst the silence. It is, as Levinas states, the ‘absolute emptiness that one
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can imagine before creation,’ and from out of this black abyss the subject as
‘I’ emerges, which represents human existence in terms of the ‘the passage
of going from being to a something’ (Levinas 1982, 51).6 In this process
subjectivity, identity, and consciousness are de-centered, they are secondary
to the primary condition of impersonal Being, which is always antecedent to
human consciousness. This is why Levinas claims that prior to the ‘I am,’
‘There is,’ and in thinking about what the passage from Being to being is
like in relation to the films of Brakhage, we might imagine that life, the
process of becoming an existent, is comprised of a succession of ‘liminal’
moments, wherein human beings work to stand-out (ec-static) from the
anonymous context of Being. In these liminal moments, we bring forth
consciousness through the poetic act of creation when language, as a
symbolic response to the void brings a world, a life, to stand-out in bold
relief from the shapeless mass that forever encompasses our existence, from
out of which our subject-hood emerges and threatens to return in death.
Consciousness, for Levinas, is the hypostatic act of establishing an identity
as separated off from the ‘There is,’ and is, in many ways, the ephemeral
attempt to escape Being. However, our human being, our subject-hood, is
never given over by Being as a ‘gift,’ it is ‘never inherited but always won
in the heat of struggle’ (Levinas 1978, 76). This struggle is the battle for a
worldly existence, and it is at once the warring against the forces of
impersonal Being and a personal battle in which we must assume the
existential responsibility for choosing and laboring toward the end of
becoming an existent. Levinas, unlike Heidegger, does not subscribe to the
notion that we are thrown-into-the-world as Being-in-the-world, in terms of
representing the primordial ontological notion that our Dasein is always
6

Levinas, recounting the move beyond Existence and Existents, states the following: ‘My
first idea was that perhaps a “being,” a “something” one could point at with a finger,
corresponds to a mastery over the ‘there is’ which dreads in being.’ Yet this does not
amount to a permanent escape or salvation from the ‘There is,’ but rather there is an act of
‘deposition’ of the ego that takes place ‘in the social relationship with the Other,’ wherein
one’s responsibility for and to the Other assumes primacy when orienting oneself to the
oppressive threat of impersonal Being. Thus, as Levinas reasons, ‘being-for-the-other,
seemed to me, as early as that time, to stop the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being,’
and ‘since that compelled my recognition and was clarified in my mind, I have hardly
spoken again in my books of the “there is” for itself. But the shadow of the “there is,” and
of nonsense, still appeared to me necessary as the very test of dis-inter-estedness’ (ibid. 5152). As Robert John Sheffler Manning shows, if there exists an escape from the weight of
Being, or the ‘There is’ (other than non-existence), it is to be found by following a
‘mysterious’ new path, which is linked to eros, a state wherein ‘there is a power capable of
transporting the self beyond him/herself to the beloved who is other’ (Sheffler 1993, 53). It
is in Levinas’s follow-up text to Existence and Existents, Time and the Other that he
pursues and deepens this line of thought, presenting ‘the social relationship as a relation
with a mystery, and it hints that perhaps the self can escape being by its relation to this
mystery, the otherness of the Other’ (ibid. 57). For a more speculative discussion
concerning the potential ‘contemporary’ implications of Levinas’s understanding of the
social relationship and the Other see: Bernasconi, Robert and Critchley, Simon (1991) ReReading Levinas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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already located in the world. Rather, Levinas views our existence as a
continued process of laboring in order belong to a world in the first instance,
for the human is always at a ‘distance’ from both Being and the world. In
short, winning a life, finding a home within the world amounts to engaging
in a struggle with primordial forces that are indifferent to our condition: Life
is labor.
It is possible to imagine such a life portrayed, or better, captured as
lived by the filmmaker: The films of Brakhage document, as consecrated
acts of subjectivity, the arduous process of resisting impersonal Being,
wracked as it is with horror and dangers, by ceaselessly struggling to wrest
our lives, our conscious existence and world from impersonal Being: We
strive to give form and shape to our world, we work to define, redefine, and
reconfigure our conscious existence while Being threatens at every turn to
overwhelm even our most valiant efforts and engulf our consciousness,
returning us to the black, shapeless void from whence we have struggled to
emerge. Brakhage is not so much attempting to fully understanding Being,
rather he is re-presenting the condition within which we find ourselves, i.e.,
he is not primarily concerned with ‘what’ Being is, rather ‘that’ it is, as a
brute fact, and the richness in his work streams from his quest to examine
through film the processes of ‘how’ we become truly as human beings, how
and to what degree we are able to shoulder the weight of the responsibility
that presses down upon us for making a life.
As articulated, life might be equated with the attempt to escape
impersonal Being, and works of art, poetic acts of creation, state building,
nation building are all testimonies to human consciousness attempting to
resist Being, to stand out again the shapeless backdrop of the void of Being.
These are all labor-intensive acts, which acquire meaning in the personal
struggle against the ontological forces that are beyond us, and since we can
never assimilate Being in knowledge it remains external, it is never made a
possession. It is not difficult to see this theme played out in Dog Star Man,
for it is possible to read the film is a testament to our laboring to establish a
world in the face of Being wherein we experience the onset and onslaught
of fatigue, the impending drive to halt or escape from the weight of our
world-building activities. In moments of fatigue we seek to refuel and remotivate, to somehow regain a semblance of strength to resist the urge to
abandon the task and continue on in the ominous presence of the
overwhelming weight of impersonal Being. For example, the woodcutter
must always be reminded of his commitment to the task, and this comes
through the experience of fatigue, wherein he is at once confronted by the
unarticulated, implicit existential responsibility and necessity to carry on up
the mountain and the concomitant desire to abandon the labor under the
sheer weight of the task.
Brakhage, with deft sensitivity and imagination, re-produces the
ontological difference between Being and beings in the films Stellar (1993),
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Study in Color and Black and White (1993), and Black Ice (1994), for these
films, while one might refer to them as light and color studies, are more
aptly conceived in terms of the glaring absence of light. These films are
dominated by the intrusion of Chaos and night on the subject’s conscious
efforts to establish a terrestrial grounding amidst the groundless chasm of
Being. In the film commentary for By Brakhage: An Anthology (2003),
Brakhage remarks about Stellar that it is ‘a visual envisioning of outer
space,’ and the void plays a dominant role in this film, for while brilliant,
fleeting flashes of luminescent celestial forms emerge, are born, in a variety
of brilliant hues, they just as quickly ‘burn out’ as they are extinguished and
consumed by the abyss from out of which they arose. Black Ice is also a
short film wherein light and color are threatened to be overtaken by the
black of night, and the zooming effect produces the feeling in the spectator,
not so much that the film is rushing toward her, but rather that she is falling
into the realm of impersonal Being, ‘the realm of falling, of vertigo and
confusion,’ as described by Vernant, and losing both her footing on the
shifting foundations of her world along with her grip on consciousness
amidst the onslaught of Being. Both of these films might be read as
reminders that the formation of subject-hood is an act that always teeters on
the brink of disaster, for the danger is ever-present that the ‘void seizes us
like the yawning of an immense gullet where everything is swallowed up by
murky darkness’ (Vernant 2001, 3).
Perhaps the film that most eloquently poetises the overwhelming
power, weight, and presence of the void of Being is Study in Color and
Black and White. The dominance of black in the frames obtrusively plays a
crucial role thematically and not just visually, for not only does it function
as a stark contrast to the brightly lit shapes, setting the vibrant colors aglow,
it also gives the tangible sense that darkness, night, and impersonal Being
threatens every second of the film to envelope and eclipse the light once and
for all. This indicates that our existence, much like the films of Brakhage, as
Levinas writes, unfolds in the ‘dread before Being,’ in terms of ‘an impotent
recoil, an evasion’ from the haunting 'shadow of the “There is”' (Levinas
1982, 51). In line with this theme, Brakhage ingeniously incorporates the
use of what might be termed the ‘cinematic caesura,’ as in the film existence
is song within The Dante Quartet (1987), which as opposed to merely
representing, through the incorporation of several pure black frames, a
pause delineating a rhythmic division in the films, as related to what has
been stated about Levinas, Brakhage has them function in an ontological
manner, reminding the spectator of the precarious nature of our being and
our constant dependence on and the intractable relationship with the
primordial void of Being that is inescapable. The radical contrast Brakhage
sets up between light and dark, between radiant color and black, or the
complete absence of light, functions beyond a mere technique related to
aesthetic composition. When describing the films I have chosen to analyse,
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one might well replace the phrase, interplay of light and dark within a
context of symmetrical and asymmetrical juxtaposition, with the observation
that their interaction is violent and resembles, more often than not, a life and
death struggle for superiority, which threatens to break beyond the horizon
of film’s frame.
To aptly conclude reflections on this theme I examine Eye Myth
(1967), a hand-painted and etched (scratched) short film that grows out of
the above philosophical notion of the ‘There is,’ i.e., that we are, from the
moment we are conscious, precariously poised on the precipice of
relinquishing our consciousness to the forces of night, of Being. This film
portrays a man, immersed inextricably within the struggle with Being
amidst the electrically charged onslaught of sensory stimuli. Brakhage
brilliantly recreates the phenomenon through the furious activity of light and
color raining down on the protagonist, as if to assault him, as he desperately
labors to give form and meaning to his world in a fleeting, and heroic,
attempt to stand-out from the shapeless chasm of the ‘There is,’ which is
represented as an ‘alien’ force which ‘strikes’ out at the man (Levinas 1982,
51). The film is grounded in the distinct and unifying notion that Being
forever defies human comprehension and refuses to be assimilated, made
the ‘same’ by us, ‘totalized’ in knowledge, and thus remains as radically
Other. As the film poetizes, our lives are a continued, ever-renewed process
of wresting beings and our being from the abyss of impersonal Being with
the accompanying understanding that those things brought to the light of
truth, to the level of personal consciousness, always hold the propensity to
sink back into the black void of primordial Being. In the span of 9-seconds,
Brakhage manages to philosophically re-present the protagonist’s
ontological condemnation to life in terms of the continued process of selfformation, deformation, and reformation, all the while haunted by the
foreboding sense of danger of primordial darkness that threatens to overtake
all of his endeavors, throwing the fleeting moments of existential clarity into
confusion as he is overwhelmed by the shear force of the oblivion.
The films I have analyzed in the final section all re-produce the
human life-task in terms of the perennial passage from Being to something,
from Being to being. Brakhage’s films capture the extreme uncertainty
bound up with this life-task, with its propensity toward disaster and abject
failure, which are experienced in moments when we are horrified and
humbled before the sublime weight and mystery of Being. To return to what
was stated at the outset, philosophically speaking, through questioning and
contemplating the problems of existence, Brakhage gleans the insight to recreate and re-produce his ‘philosophical’ vision of things in the artistic
medium of film, and what he intimates is the understanding of both the
transcendental conditions structuring all human experience as well the
transcendent nature of the human being, i.e., the human’s ability to stand
outside or beyond both itself and Being. This latter notion is intimately
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linked with the ability of the human being to project itself into the future as
something that is ‘not-yet’ actualized, an ability that is distinctly human,
and in this projection creatively imagine a ‘self’ that is ‘not-yet’ fulfilled or
actualized, but is ‘no-longer’ identical with the self in its present
instantiation. For in the moment of futural projection, we are simultaneously
willing something new and unique, something that has not yet arrived and is
still on the approach, and decidedly rejecting aspects our present state of
existence that we seek to move beyond, to change, to transcend.
In a universe that is devoid of intrinsic meaning, in a world that
continually resists our most concerted and organized efforts to understand it
or justify it in religious, scientific, or moral terms, Brakhage’s films testify,
in a manner reminiscent of Nietzsche, that it is perhaps only as an ‘aesthetic
phenomenon,’7 a phenomenon of art, that the world might be justified, or
perhaps, more appropriately, rendered beautiful and meaningful – and
Brakhage found his world both intensely beautiful and meaningful.
However, as alluring and beautiful as Brakhage’s aesthetics may be, they
are also intensely strange and frightening, this because their beauty is
inseparable from the grave and disturbing circumstances that gave rise to his
art, and below, Camper captures this notion when describing the thrust of
Brakhage’s filmmaking in the following terms:
[H]is project was always to explore the richness of seeing and of life
in its totality, accepting no givens about what seeing, or the film
image, or life itself is, but always pushing toward the unknown […]
His films are made with an intensity, a kind of ‘wits end’
desperation, that suggests a consciousness on the brink. Brakhage
was not only a craftsman doing something he loved; he used his craft
to try to come to an understanding of whether – and on what terms –
he could continue to go on living. (Camper 2003)8
7

The quotation, one of two expressing Nietzsche’s main tenet in BT, runs as follows:
‘[O]ur highest dignity lies in the meaning of works of art – for it is only as an aesthetic
phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified’ (Nietzsche 1967, 32). In
Nietzsche’s “Attempt at Self-Criticism,” added to the 1886 publication of BT, he makes
clear that the world as he envisions it defies both explanation and justification in terms of
philosophy, science, religion, and, perhaps most importantly, traditional moral terms, for in
the book it is ‘art – and not morality’ that is ‘presented as the properly metaphysical
activity of man’ (ibid. 7). The themes addressed above are also present to Nietzsche’s
philosophy. For example, Nietzsche describes Dionysus as ‘an entirely thoughtless and
amoral artist-god,’ he may well have been describing the human in terms of a higher being
embodying the pessimism of strength that was equated with the Greeks of antiquity: Man,
who is ‘both creating and destroying, in doing both good and ill, wishes to experience that
same joy and glory; who creating worlds, rids himself of the affliction of abundance and
super-abundance, of the suffering of his eternal contradictions.’ Art alone, through illusion,
provides for the ‘redemption and deliverance’ of the ‘most afflicted, contrary, contradictory
being’ – man - from the horrors of existence (ibid. 8).
8
While it has been my aim to read Brakhage through the conceptual framework of
phenomenology-ontology, there are other interesting pathways that one might follow when
philosophically analyzing Brakhage’s filmmaking, for example: (1) it is interesting to note
that many of his films emerge directly from philosophical meditation on traumatic events -
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This ‘project,’ as I have attempted to show, was ultimately embodied and
expressed within Brakhage’s pursuit of art as it was grounded in legitimate
philosophical inquiry, which dealt seriously with philosophical issues
through the medium of filmic aesthetics. As Brakhage reminds us, the
human is complex. However, ‘philosophy need not be high flown, it is
enough to dwell on what lies close and immediate in the here and now’
(Heidegger 1966, 52). Anyone can follow the path of meditative thought,
thinking in her own way, within her own limits, and through his films
Brakhage wanted to make us aware that ‘each of us can become an inner
explorer, continually pushing toward some new frontier of consciousness’
(Camper 2003, 9). I have always viewed philosophy as a form of creative
problem solving, but perhaps a better definition would refer philosophy to a
form of thinking that is never truly at an end, never completed. While its
scope is grand and its issues many and varied, philosophy most often finds
its subject matter, its place and home-ground, within the immediate realm of
our day-to-day lives. Much like Brakhage, it is possible to think seriously
and philosophically about such things as this patch of earth, this present
time in history, this life with family and friends, and all of these things, it
might be said, viewed through the eyes and lens of the filmmaker, served as
artistic inspiration, which rooted him philosophically in the world.
Brakhage’s films force us to consider a crucial aspect of philosophy
that is often overlooked, namely, we often consider philosophy a discipline
that seeks to ‘solve’ the problems of existence, and what is glossed in this
understanding is that prior to any move to solve problems, philosophy must
first seek a proper understanding of the issues, which often entails a
reformulation of the initial questions that we ask, which amounts to an
inquiry into the questions themselves in order to clarify the manner in which
to best approach the problems in the first instance. If the films of Brakhage
are philosophical queries in celluloid, as I have attempted to show, then they
a fall on a patch of black ice that left him blind for a brief period of time, persistent and
serious illnesses, and oppressive thoughts of suicide. It is possible to link Brakhage’s
personal catastrophe to what Blanchot refers to as the ‘disaster,’ which inspires creative and
imaginative attempts to give voice, life, and meaning to extraordinary moments that rattle
our ontological foundations. In striving to re-produce the ‘disaster,’ we might say that
Brakhage endeavors to mediate, repair, and rejoin those aspects of his life that personal
catastrophe has torn asunder, inscribing in film, through form and expression, that which is
ineffable or otherwise incomprehensible in terms of everyday language (Blanchot 1986); (2)
it is possible to interpret Brakhage’s will-to-create through persistent and intense illness in
terms reminiscent of Nietzsche’s philosophizing, whose art, according to Klossowski, was
not born of madness or pathology, but rather waxed and waned in sympathetic and
rhythmic harmony with the varying degrees of intensity associated with the pathological
states afflicting Nietzsche (Klossowski 1997); and (3) it is possible to relate the potential of
suicide haunting Brakhage’s existence to the perennial question/problem of philosophy as
shockingly posed by Camus: ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that
is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy’ (Camus 1983, 3).
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denote the on-the-wayness of philosophy, the incompleteness of all
philosophical thought. However, this is not a weakness in or critique of
philosophy, this simply demonstrates the intractable nature of the things
philosophy deals with, and one can view this as problematic or, as did
Brakhage, through the attunement of ‘wonder’ (thauma), wherein the world
is revealed in such a way that our existence, although never fully explained
or justified, shot through as it is with a preponderance of profuse and intense
pain and suffering, also holds the ‘possibility of deep satisfaction and indeed,
in exalted moments, of perfection’ (Jaspers 1954, 17). Brakhage’s films
undoubtedly give us many of these co-called ‘exalted moments of
perfection,’ and to apprehend this reality, and put this reality in question
with the courage, sensitivity, and aesthetic acuity of Brakhage, amounts to
grasping what Jaspers calls the ‘the aim of the philosophical endeavor’
(Jaspers 1954, 17).
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